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When Too Little Is Too Much: Why the 
Supreme Court Should Either Explain Its 
Opinions or Keep Them to Itself 
Jonah J. Horwitz†
In 1972, the Supreme Court released what appears on its 
face to be one of the simplest opinions in its history. That deci-
sion, Baker v. Nelson,
 
1 read, in its entirety: “The appeal is dis-
missed for want of a substantial federal question.” That’s it. 
Eleven straightforward words. But, as is often the case in the 
law, great complexity lurks under the surface, for this terse or-
der has been cited by no fewer than sixty-two judicial opinions 
and 314 secondary sources. Even more amazingly, Baker has 
come to assume a prominent place in the debate over gay mar-
riage, one of the most controversial legal battles of our era. This 
is so because the decision by the Minnesota Supreme Court un-
der review in that case held that same sex marriage was not 
protected by the Constitution.2 Consequently, the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s cursory order could be read as an acknowledg-
ment that bans on same sex marriage are constitutionally per-
missible.3 For these reasons, the order is discussed at length in 
the Second Circuit’s opinion in Windsor v. United States,4 the 
vehicle for the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment on the De-
fense of Marriage Act.5
 
†  BA with honors, 2006, Swarthmore College. JD cum laude, Order of 
the Coif, 2010, Northwestern University School of Law. The author is current-
ly clerking for a judge on the United States Court of Appeals. He can be con-
tacted at horwitz.jonah@gmail.com. Copyright © 2013 by Jonah J. Horwitz. 
  
 1. 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
 2. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).  
 3. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 
F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2012) (summarizing that argument), cert. denied, No. 12-97, 
2013 WL 3213571 (U.S. June 27, 2013).  
 4. 699 F.3d 169, 178–79 (2d Cir.), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
 5. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
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Unsurprisingly, Baker is also examined in detail in the 
briefs in that case before the Supreme Court. To give some idea 
of the order’s importance in Windsor, the respondent opens its 
case for applying rational basis, a critical piece of its argument, 
with a paragraph on Baker.6 In another demonstration of how 
significant the summary dismissal became to the dispute, one 
amicus brief goes out of its way to chastise the district court for 
cavalierly disobeying precedent in its treatment of Baker.7
Eleven words have given birth to thousands of others, and 
have led to endless debate amongst courts, litigants, and schol-
ars, unnecessarily consuming their valuable time and energy. 
The solution is self-evident. In Baker, the Supreme Court 
should have either explained why it believed there was no 
“substantial federal question” or just dismissed the appeal 
without providing any justification for its decision.
  
8
To put the argument in context, consider first principles. 
The most fundamental and distinctive quality of the common 
law system is that the opinion of an appellate court binds a fu-
ture court sitting within the same jurisdiction.
 The one 
thing it should not have done was flatly state a legal conclusion 
while offering no reasoning whatsoever, requiring us all to en-
gage in a lengthy, high-stakes, and ultimately pointless game 
of mind-reading. More broadly, the Supreme Court (and any 
other appellate court) should strive to avoid declaring legal 
principles if it is unwilling to substantiate them, lest it create 
more confusion in the law than clarity.  
9 That is, a judge 
must resolve any given dispute consistently with the resolution 
of similar disputes in the past.10 In this way we get predictabil-
ity in the law and all the other benefits that come with it: effi-
ciency, fairness, and so on.11
 
 6. Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory 
Group of the U.S. House of Representatives at 25–26, United States v. Wind-
sor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 267026, at *25–26. 
 To effectively apply a previous de-
 7. Brief Amicus Curiae on the Merits of Citizens United's National 
Committee for Family, Faith and Prayer et al. at 5 n.4, United States v. Wind-
sor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 355759 at *5 n.4. 
 8. Because the appeal was one of right, the Court could not just deny cer-
tiorari as it ordinarily can. See HARVARD LAW REVIEW EDITORIAL BD., Devel-
opments in the Law – The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 
1274 (1980).  
 9. See, e.g., Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 
491 (2009).  
 10. See, e.g., Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After the Found-
ing, 42 B.C. L. REV. 81, 86 (2000).  
 11. See, e.g., Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 
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cision to a present controversy, it helps to know what the previ-
ous judge was thinking in ruling as he or she did. There are 
typically numerous facts in a given case, and often a number of 
discrete legal issues. Which aspect of Officer Smith’s interroga-
tion did or did not violate Defendant Doe’s Fifth Amendment 
rights?12 What about ABC Corporation’s conduct did or did not 
constitute wrongful termination?13 In the absence of such in-
formation, a court is left to stumble through the dark in a blind 
search for unarticulated legal principles and unemphasized 
dispositive facts. Or, viewing the issue from a more cynical per-
spective, a court is free to discern whatever rule it desires in 
the service of reaching a pre-determined outcome.14
On top of these background principles, template the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s role in our system of government. Its core 
mission is to answer the preeminent legal questions of the day 
and to provide guidance to everyone—lawyers, litigants, lower 
courts, and lay citizens—in how to act in accordance with those 
answers.
  
15 Every year, the courts take up weighty issues with 
sweeping political, economic, and social implications. The judi-
ciary has more or less the final say on the limits of our free-
speech rights, on the ability of the state to deprive us of our lib-
erty, and on the power of the federal government, to pick but a 




 Administratively, it makes sense for a single entity to 
have the ultimate authority over the judicial system and its de-
 12. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 670 F.3d 222, 230–33 (2d Cir. 2012), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 48 (2012). 
 13. See, e.g., Straughn v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 250 F.3d 23, 44–45 (1st 
Cir. 2001). 
 14. A collateral benefit of reasoned judicial opinions is that parties, par-
ticularly losing ones, get the respect and satisfaction of knowing their argu-
ments were heard and resolved rationally, and society appreciates the logic 
underpinning important judicial decision-making. These benefits are unrelat-
ed to the point being made here, because a high court's summary dispositions 
provide none of these benefits.  
 15. See, e.g., David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride 
Circuit Again, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1710, 1711 (2007) ("Today's Justices spend 
roughly nine months a year cloistered in the Supreme Court building in Wash-
ington, D.C., making decisions and issuing opinions on some of the most im-
portant issues of the day."); Steve Subrin, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Contempt for 
Rules, Statutes, the Constitution, and Elemental Fairness, 12 NEV. L.J. 571, 
571 (2012) ("[J]udicial opinions of the Supreme Court should give guidance to 
the lower courts so that judges, lawyers, and clients know how to act in the 
future.").  
 16. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).  
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cisions on such crucial matters; otherwise, we would live in 
chaos and uncertainty. Psychologically, too, there must be a 
single point at the top of the pyramid. We need an august 
building in our capital to gather around when the law is ready 
to speak with finality on an issue of great importance. We need 
a finite, visible group of officials to beseech, to praise, and to 
lambaste as we debate the way forward. And, to come back at 
last to our starting point, we need, at the end of the day, a sin-
gle document, meticulously prepared, telling us what the law 
will be and why.  
To recapitulate, the genius of our legal philosophy is its in-
sistence on reasoned explanation, and the genius of our legal 
structure is its placement of trust in a single body to offer that 
reasoned explanation when it matters most. It should be ap-
parent by now just how badly the Court failed us in Baker. In 
that paltry order, it offered not a word of explanation. We 
might as well substitute for our elaborate court system a tea-
leaf-spreading ceremony, or send our judges on pilgrimages to 
visit the oracle. In essence, that is how the lawyers and lower 
courts attempted to deal with Baker’s role in the gay marriage 
case, as they sought to decode its cryptic pronouncement and 
apply it to the dispute at hand. 
Now to address a couple of potential objections. First, the 
reader might understandably be distracted by the year Baker 
came down. In 1972, gay marriage was not nearly the hot pota-
to issue it is today.17 Thus, it might seem unfair to play up the 
importance of the decision only in retrospect. However, it is not 
unfair in the slightest, as the Justices should have known bet-
ter. Any decision by the Court is likely to work its way into an 
important case, no matter how trivial it may have been at the 
time, by virtue of the common law reasoning process.18
The persistent critic might continue: if explanation is so 
pivotal to the Supreme Court’s work, Baker is but a drop in the 
 The only 
precedent that binds the Court is its own, and it does not decide 
so many cases that it can sift through the reporters looking for 
more favorable law, a luxury a higher-volume court might 
have. An order like the one in Baker places a grain of sand in 
the oyster shell, one that has inevitably grown into a cumber-
some pearl that demands to be dealt with eventually, one way 
or another.  
 
 17. See Lance McMillian, Adultery as Tort, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1987, 2010–11 
(2012). 
 18. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text. 
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ocean. A vast majority of petitions for certiorari are denied 
without any written justification.19
To respond, context is everything. When the Court denies a 
petition for certiorari in a lengthy table of identical orders, it 
does not purport to make any statement about the law, and ex-
cept for highly constrained exceptions, no one would ever mis-
take it for doing so.
 Your beef should be with 
the whole process, not one measly iteration of it.  
20
Now to the most pressing objection. To inform the reader 
who may have been living under a rock, the Supreme Court fi-
nally decided Windsor, after what seemed an endless wait. 
None of the Justices saw fit to include a mention of Baker in 
any of the four opinions, not even in a cursory footnote, not 
once in seventy-seven total pages of scholarly, exhaustively cit-
ed writings. What then, one might ask, is the big deal? The or-
der did not affect the case one bit, so surely we can relegate it 
to the dustbin of history and not give it another thought? Un-
fortunately, the answer is no. The very absence of any discus-
sion of Baker in the DOMA decision underscores exactly how 
much of a problem it is. Summary orders from the Supreme 
Court on the merits are, by the Court’s own command, binding 
law.
 That a question is not ripe for the Court’s 
review says nothing about what the correct answer to the ques-
tion is. By contrast, to pronounce the absence of a substantial 
federal question is very much to establish a legal proposition, 
and to do so without defending the proposition is to invite need-
less confusion and conjecture. Phrased differently, and perhaps 
more simply, the traditional denial of certiorari creates no law. 
An order like the one in Baker does create law, but law that no 
one understands well enough to even intelligently try to obey. 
21
 
 19. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 899 (2009) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("The success rate for certiorari petitions before this 
Court is approximately 1.1% . . . .").  
 It is a breathtaking departure from the rule of law as it 
operates in a common law system for a nation’s high court to 
issue what is, by its own lights, a precedential decision and 
then to simply ignore that precedent when it is precisely on 
point in a hugely consequential case, and all because the Court 
 20. The only real lessons that can plausibly be drawn from the Court's 
denials of certiorari relate to its own views about what requires its interven-
tion. See, e.g., Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Mixed Reality: How the Laws of Virtual 
Worlds Govern Everyday Life, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 55, 88 n.162 (2012) 
("The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari suggests that the circuit split is not 
significant enough to justify review.").  
 21. See, e.g., Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 175–76 (1977).  
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did not bother to explain it. One struggles to imagine a more 
profound perversion of the judicial model we have spent the 
last two and a half centuries developing. Perhaps the most 
troubling thing about Windsor’s (non)treatment of Baker is the 
unanimity between the Justices on this point. For a case of 
such length and significance, it is nothing short of amazing that 
no one refers, even in passing, to what struck the lower courts 
and the litigants as a potentially dispositive case. Justice Ken-
nedy and his allies felt no need to distinguish it in the majority 
opinion, and Justice Scalia and his saw no cause to use it as 
another piece of ammunition in his dissent. For a case that 
provoked such deep and bitter disagreement between the mem-
bers of the Court, the ease with which they collectively decided 
to ignore their own case law is shocking. Ironically, in the 
Court’s other watershed gay marriage decision this year, it did 
choose to cite a very similar summary order as authority,22
Given the prominent role Baker played in the litigation 
leading up to the Supreme Court, the Justices presumably 
spent some of their own valuable time struggling to decipher 
these eleven opaque words delivered by their ancestors. Their 
astonishing failure to even mention this highly relevant prece-
dent likely stemmed from the fact that they, along with the rest 
of us, had no idea why the Baker court issued that ruling, and 
thus no idea how to apply it. In light of that frustrating experi-
ence, they will hopefully see fit not to subject their successors 
to the same futile and counterproductive labor. In future, they 
should either fully explain what they are doing, or refrain from 
comment altogether. We are none of us clairvoyants, not even 
the eminences at One First Street. Better to write on a blank 
slate than a slate filled with indecipherable hieroglyphics.  
 
proving just how quixotically the Court treats these orders. 
 
 
 22. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2013) (citing Don’t 
Bankrupt Wash. Comm. v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 460 U.S. 
1077 (1983), for the proposition that it summarily dismissed an appeal for lack 
of standing).  
